University of Tehran Iranian Economic Review 1026-6542 23 1 2019 01 01 Monitoring Expenditures on Tax Collection and Tax Evasion: The Case of Iran 149 161 69103 10.22059/ier.2018.69103 EN Ali Hussein Samadi Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics, Management and Social Sciences, Shiraz University, Shiraz, Iran Shohreh Nasirabadi Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics, Management and Social Sciences, Shiraz University, Shiraz, Iran Journal Article 2017 04 09 T<br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> he main aim of this paper is analyzing the relationship between tax evasion and the monitoring expenditure on tax collectionin Iran. For doing so, we have used a simulation model for determining optimal level of monitoring expenses on tax collection. The results showed that, a greater portion of government expenses must be allocated to monitor the tax collection, although do this reduces tax evasion, but have a negative effect on economic growth. Thus, instead of  increasing monitoring expenses in line with reducing tax evasion, it is better to reduce taxes rate in a way that in addition not to decrease in motivation of economic agents activity, it also causes decrease in motivation of tax evasion.<br />   https://ier.ut.ac.ir/article_69103_311e2c97f4ba35cacf26c1c723aad89e.pdf