A Novel Analysis of Risk Sharing Effects on Income Inequality in Informal Insurances


Faculty of Economics & Administrative Sciences, University of Mazandaran



his study aims to demonstrate that joining in risk sharing network leads to the reduction in incomes volatility. In this respect, income variance for a group of members in an informal insurance is modelled in which income variance prior to joining risk sharing network and after joining is analyzed statistically. A Monte Carlo simulation technique is used to prove the result. To extend and analyze the sensitivity, a simulation is performed on either small size population or large size population, the probability of occurrence and the amount of loss are also repeated in all levels. The result of study shows that joining to risk sharing network significantly decreases the income volatility. It is also proved that the probability of occurrence and the amount of loss positively affect the intensity of income volatility.


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