A Proposed Mechanism for the Iranian Model of Kidney Donation (A Comparison of the Iranian and Roth’s Models)


1 Faculty of Economics, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran

2 Department of Economics, Mofid University, Qom, Iran


Optimal resource allocation by means of the price mechanism is one of the main duties of the economics. Optimum allocation is sometimes realized not through the price mechanism, but via assignment algorithms due to an insufficient number of agents on either side of the exchange. Facing the same problem, the kidney market may be considered as a type of market failure that calls for market design. Indeed, such design is regarded as a solution to the problem. Although the current model of organ transplants for non-relative living donors in Iran brings patients certain benefits, it suffers from serious weaknesses that require revisions. The present study aims to analyze the kidney market using a matching theory which is a subset of market design. Then a model is developed in a test market for the research sample in Hamadan Province in 2015. Eventually, recommendations are made to modify the Iranian model of kidney donation. Despite Roth’s model, the proposed model is based on two-sided matching. In this regard, information on 40 kidney suppliers and demanders were recorded in a clearinghouse. Subsequently, agents’ preferences on either side of the market (i.e. patients and donors) were ranked based on blood-type, tissue, duration of disease, age, and gender compatibility. Applying the proposed model to the research sample, the results showed that 19 out of 20 pairs gained access to stable allocations.


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