Estimating Property Rights Expenditures in Iran

Document Type : Research Paper


1 Associate Professor of Economics, Shiraz University, Shiraz, Iran

2 Ph.D. Candidate in Dept. of Economics, Shiraz University, Shiraz, Iran


There are many indices for measuring property rights (PR) security. They may be classified into two groups: subjective proxies and objective proxies. Most of the proxies are subjective. One contribution of this paper is introducing a new approach for measuring government expenditures devoted to PR protection. Calculating physical capital within the introduced new approach is another contribution of this paper. Finally, the proposed approach is applied for measuring PR and physical capital in Iran.


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